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Abstract 
 People with intellectual or developmental disabilities face abuse at much higher 
rates than people without disabilities. Although reporting abuse is possible, abusers 
have many options on hand if they want to use technology to prevent this reporting. 
This paper details and structures these tactics. It also describes mitigations that a victim 
of abuse may use to prevent or diminish the effects of an abusers' tactics.  
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1. Introduction 
 Historically, intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD) have been defined 
negatively. That is, they have been defined by what a person with these disabilities 
cannot do that a person without disabilities would be able to do. This is a tempting but 
untenable definition, as it posits a universal idea of Human by which particular humans 
are to be compared and thus categorized. In response to this negative definition, a 
positive definition arose, defining people with IDD by what societal supports (e.g., 
ramps leading into buildings for people with wheelchairs, state agencies that help with 
finding employment) they need to live fulfilled lives. This definition can still be too one-
sided, however. I am following C. Frauenberger’s [1] definition, attempting to skirt 
between the negative and positive definitions of IDD and taking both into account. 
 People living with IDD face much higher rates of abuse than populations without 
IDD on average. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, people with IDD are about 
4.5 times as likely to be sexually abused in their life compared to people without 
disabilities [7]. According to K. McKenzie et al. [5], about 1% of the population of the US 
lives with IDD. Much infrastructure already exists for the purposes of handling reports 
of abuse. The Disabled Persons Protection Commission in Massachusetts provides 
education relating what abuse is and how to respond to it and also takes up reports of 
abuse and then works with police to investigate reports. Triangle, Inc., another 
Massachusetts-based organization, provides self-defense training for people with IDD 
for the purposes of protecting themselves against abuse. In addition, many people, 
because of their occupation, are required by law to report incidences of abuse they are 
told of. These people include doctors, nurses, psychologists, teachers, and social 
workers. 
There is nonetheless much room for improving methods of reporting abuse, 
however. Specifically, current reporting resources can be difficult to tap into for a given 
person with IDD. Calling a phone number can be very difficult for some. Others may be 
too isolated to be able to speak with a mandated reporter. Others still may be pressured 
by their abuser into not reporting under threat of reprisals. One goal of this project is to 
lay the groundwork for exploring how technology can be used to significantly ease the 
process of reporting abuse among an IDD population. Alongside this paper, a group of 
students from Worcester Polytechnic Institute are working on the design of a phone app 
that can be used to educate about abuse and report abuse. Consideration is also being 
put in towards the possibility of making a website that fulfills the same purposes. 
 Going down this road raises further concerns. I anticipate that an abuser will not 
sit back idly in the event that reporting abuse becomes much easier. As a result, the 
main focus of this project becomes researching and then analyzing how an abuser may 
try to use technology to prevent the reporting of abuse. I have divided the tactics 
available to an abuser into four categories: creating a sense of omnipresence, isolating 
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the victim, humiliating or punishing the victim, and threatening the victim. I have also 
created a graph that shows the necessary conditions an abuser needs to fulfill to carry 
out the different attacks I have listed. In addition to this analysis of abuse tactics, I have 
determined strategies using technology that can be used to either defend against or 
mitigate the effects of an abuser’s “counter-attacks.” I have then detailed these 
mitigations and described how certain tactics cannot be abated by existing technologies. 
Before I explicitly address my results, however, I will go over the methodology I followed 
in completing this project. I will then briefly review scholarly work related to this paper. 
From then, I will detail abusers’ reporting prevention tactics and the extant 
technological mitigations thereof.  
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2. Methodology 
 My goal in this paper was to study how abusers can prevent the victims of their 
abuse from reporting said abuse and then to formulate mitigations whereby a victim will 
be able to sidestep or prevent the abusers’ preventative measures. To begin down this 
path, I needed to research ways that abusers can use technology to prevent the abused 
from reporting them. I read a series of papers detailing how technology is used in 
intimate partner violence (IPV). The large majority of victims of abuse detailed in the 
papers did not have IDD, although most of the abuse tactics described in them could 
easily be translated from an IPV context to one where a person with IDD is being 
abused. From these papers, as well as from discussions, I gathered together a large 
group of “attacks” someone could use to prevent a person with IDD from reporting 
abuse. In this paper, I will refer to these attacks as tactics. The tactics collated range 
from installing spyware on someone’s phone to imitating them online to simply 
destroying the person’s phone. 
 With this collection of tactics on hand, I set about arranging them in a structural 
fashion. Specifically, I organized them in a directed rooted tree. After several iterations 
of tree designs, I developed a list of counter-attacks and preventative measures, referred 
to in this paper as mitigations, to be deployed against the tactics in the tree. I then went 
on to categorize the mitigations and analyze them in the context of the tactics in the tree. 
 As a final point, it should be made clear that I have consciously aimed to focus on 
tactics and mitigations that involve technology. My purview is the realm of technology, 
and thus the mitigations I can offer will be technological. As technological solutions 
generally correspond to technological problems, I have restricted the tactics being 
analyzed to those involving technology. 
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3. Related Work 
 Research concerning how technology is used to abuse people with IDD is next to 
naught. However, a recent series of three papers on how technology is used in intimate 
partner violence (IPV) written by researchers based primarily out of Cornell Tech, 
Cornell University, and New York University proved to be immensely useful to this 
paper’s realization.  
R. Chatterjee et al. [6], in the first of these papers, detail how abusers can use 
spyware to track the phone activity of their partners. They focus both on how apps 
designed with benign purposes in mind, such as Find My iPhone, and apps designed 
specifically for spying can be used to perpetuate IPV. They use search engines and app 
store searches to see how prevalent phone spyware is and how easy it is to find it. 
Particularly concerning is their description of phones that can be purchased which have 
spyware preinstalled—spyware that has root access, allowing an abuser to remotely 
track any and all things done using that phone. They then go on to study the 
effectiveness of existing Android malware-detection software at detecting and removing 
spyware. 
 D. Freed et al. [2], in the second paper in the series, describe more generally how 
technology is used to perpetuate IPV, giving many examples and covering a large 
number of abuse techniques. The paper is notable for detailing how abusers represent a 
different security threat model from that of most cybersecurity situations: an attacker 
who is UI-bound yet has intimate knowledge of and often personal control over the 
victim of the attack. They also give suggestions for how software UI can be designed 
with preventing IPV in mind. 
In another paper, the third in the series, D. Freed et al. [3] further build on the 
previous paper. They provide more examples of how technology is used in IPV, explore 
how case workers may be able to act effectively when a client is being abused using 
technology, and study how existing law intersects with the subject. They also give 
further recommendations for UI design. 
Aside from these three papers, D. Woodlock [4] explores how technology can 
facilitate stalking by intimate partners or ex-partners. Most importantly, it classifies 
technology-based stalking tactics into a model used, in slightly modified form, by this 
paper. Woodlock classifies these tactics into ones which create a sense of omnipresence, 
ones which isolate the victim of abuse, and ones meant to humiliate or punish the 
victim. 
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4. Tactics 
 From an abuser’s standpoint, allowing the victim of their abuse to report their 
abuse would be, to say the least, a compromising situation. Abusers have a strong 
interest in keeping their victims from reporting them. Luckily for them and unluckily for 
us, they have many possible routes to go down if they want to keep knowledge of their 
abuse from getting out. In this section, I detail a large number of tactics that an abuser 
could use to keep the reporting of abuse from happening. I have organized these tactics 
in a directed rooted tree. 
 In this tree, the root node (i.e., the ultimate goal of an abuser) is the prevention of 
their abuse being reported. The tree is laid out so that an arrow between two nodes 
represents a conditional relation. The node doing the pointing acts as a condition for the 
possibility of the node being pointed at. Arrows that have no slashes through them 
represent sufficient but not necessary conditions. Arrows with two slashes through them 
represent necessary but not sufficient conditions. Thus, one or many of the four nodes 
pointing towards the root node (preventing reporting) can be used to fulfill it. 
 There are four main categories of tactics I have identified that can be used to 
prevent reporting. These are the creation of a sense of omnipresence, the isolation of a 
victim, the humiliation or punishment of a victim, and the threatening of a victim. In 
what follows, I will outline the four categories of tactics. More detail on them can be 
found in Appendix x. 
 
Figure 1: Creating a sense of omnipresence 
 
 From an abuser’s standpoint, creating a sense of omnipresence keeps a victim of 
abuse from reporting because, if the tactic is carried out successfully, the victim will feel 
as though the abuser could be watching them at any time. The victim will have picked up 
on an implicit message from the abuser: “If you report me, I will know, and there will 
probably be negative consequences coming from me.” To create a sense of 
omnipresence, an abuser can follow one of two paths.  
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Figure 2: Spying on the Victim 
 
For the first, the abuser must first gain more information about the victim than 
the victim wants the abuser to. An abuser may decide to repurpose mechanisms 
designed for benign purposes (e.g. they may look on Facebook or use GPS services like 
Find My iPhone to see where the victim is going or look at phone records to see who the 
victim is calling). They may also use mechanisms specifically designed for spying, such 
as spyware or bug microphones. The abuser can also gather information about the 
victim by contacting people near the victim. Post-espionage, the abuser must 
communicate to the victim, either explicitly or implicitly, that they have gathered this 
information. If an abuser spies on their victim but never does anything that would tip off 
the victim to the spying, the spying becomes ineffectual in relation to the goal of 
preventing the victim from reporting. In order to communicate information to the 
victim, an abuser can contact them directly (such as over social media, email, or SMS), 
can get other people to contact them (proxy harassment), or can contact people around 
the victim such as friends or caretakers. The effectiveness of this tactic is amplified to 
the degree that the victim perceives the abuser as a threat—that they believe the abuser 
will carry out reprisals for actions perceived as missteps or slights.  
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Figure 3: Harassing the Victim 
 
The second route only requires that the abuser contacts the victim in a fear-
instilling manner, whether this contact be quantitatively significant (e.g., sending 
hundreds of texts a day), qualitatively significant (e.g., saying frightening things in 
texts), or both. The effect of this tactic is to keep the abuser on the victim’s mind. The 
victim, in the middle of considering reporting, may suddenly think of the abuser and 
then think “What if they found out? What would happen then?” 
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Figure 4: Isolating the Victim 
 
The second group of tactics used to prevent a victim of abuse from reporting 
involves isolating the victim. The goal of isolating the victim is to deprive them of all 
social contacts that they could use to better their situation. This can be carried out either 
through wearing down the victim’s relationships with friends, family members, 
coworkers, or acquaintances or by cutting off media of communication that the victim 
could use to ask for help. These tactics greatly lessen a victim’s ability to report, as 
reporting requires contact with the outside world. They also lessen the chance that a 
victim of abuse will come across fortuitous social interactions that lead to reporting. 
That is to say, even if a victim of abuse has gone into a conversation without the thought 
of reporting abuse on their mind, the conversation could end up steering them towards 
reporting resources. With a lessened ability to communicate with people, situations such 
as this become much less likely to happen. 
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Figure 5: Humiliating / punishing the victim 
 
 The third category contains those tactics where an abuser attempts to humiliate 
or punish the victim. The tactics in this category may be carried out as revenge for 
perceived missteps carried out by the victim. An abuser could post defamatory or 
embarrassing things about the victim online, could share intimate photos or videos of 
the victim, or could leak sensitive personal information such as the victim’s address or 
social security number. Tactics such as these prevent reporting because they can instill a 
feeling of powerlessness in a victim of abuse. They diminish the victim’s autonomy and 
can take an emotional toll. In a situation where a victim of abuse has reported abuse in 
the past but where this reporting didn’t end the abuse, the abuser may have used tactics 
in this category as a form of revenge. The victim in this situation may feel discouraged to 
the utmost; they may feel that if they try to report again, the same situation will replay 
itself. 
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Figure 6: Threatening the victim 
 
 The fourth category involves threatening the victim. This category differentiates 
itself from the harassing section of the first category by its explicitness. Whereas in 
harassing the victim, a threat can be implied, in this category it is made explicit. This 
category is notable in that any other tactic detailed above in this paper can be threatened 
to be carried out. An abuser may threaten to install spyware on the victim’s phone, lock 
the victim out of their social media accounts, or release compromising information 
about the victim, for a few examples. 
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5. Mitigations 
 Although any given abuser will have many potential tactics at their disposal to 
prevent their victim from reporting abuse, most of these can be countered or hampered 
by means employed by the victim. I refer to these means as mitigations. In this section, I 
detail mitigation strategies that can be used to prevent or reduce the harmful effects of 
the abuse tactics described in the above section. I have constrained myself to only 
describing mitigations which necessarily involve technology. I have also kept myself to 
technologies which already exist. These restrictions leave gaps behind—certain abuse 
tactics remain without relevant mitigations. Hopefully in the future, more research will 
be done on both mitigations that do not involve technology and on the potential creation 
of bespoke technologies for the purposes of mitigation. 
 
Figure 7: Mitigation categories 
 
 I have classified the mitigations detailed below into five categories (as seen in 
Figure 7). The first four categories derive from different layers of functionality in a 
device such as a phone or a computer. The outermost layer is that of the device itself. 
This category is relevant to mitigations involving the most basic functionality of a 
device, such as the setting or changing of a password. The next layer is that of the 
operating system of the device. Mitigations in this category involve things like altering 
app permissions or installing new software. The next layer is the app layer. It has to do 
with the functionality of applications on the device. Mitigations in this category include 
things like making a new Facebook account, setting up two-factor authentication for 
email login, and blocking someone’s phone number. It should be noted that for the 
purposes of this paper I am including phone apps, computer software, and websites in 
the category of applications. For example, a Facebook application on a phone or 
computer and facebook.com as visited on a web browser are both being considered 
applications. The innermost layer is that of data created by or using apps. This layer is 
relevant where backing up data serves as a mitigation to an abuse tactic. I have also 
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distinguished secondary categories for cases where a mitigation only applies to multi-
user devices such as computers, as opposed to phones. The fifth category involves 
getting a new device. Using these categories, I have grouped myriad mitigations in Table 
1 below. In Table 1, mitigations, presented from the point of view of a given victim, are 
grouped with the tactics, presented from the point of view of a given abuser, that they 
are meant to counter. 
Mitigation 
Category 
Mitigation Relevant Tactics 
Device Setting a new, strong password Breaking into one of the victim’s devices or 
accounts by having the password or 
because it has no password 
System Disabling GPS permissions Tracking the victim’s movements using 
GPS software or spyware 
Installing malware detection software Tracking the victim’s actions using spyware 
System of Multi-
User Device 
Installing two-factor authentication 
software for computer login 
Breaking into the victim’s computer 
App Blocking the abuser on social media Tracking the victim’s actions through their 
posts on social media, harassing the victim 
over social media, getting other people to 
harass the victim over social media, 
threatening the victim over social media 
Increasing privacy settings on social 
media 
Tracking the victim’s actions through their 
posts on social media, harassing the victim 
over social media, getting other people to 
harass the victim over social media, 
threatening the victim over social media 
Reporting the abuser on social media Harassing the victim over social media, 
getting other people to harass the victim 
over social media, threatening the victim 
over social media 
Blocking the abuser’s phone number Harassing the victim over the phone, 
getting other people to harass the victim 
over the phone, threatening the victim over 
the phone 
Getting a new account or plan Tracking the victim’s actions through a 
shared bank account, tracking the victim’s 
phone calls by looking at phone records, 
cancelling the victim’s phone plan, turning 
off the victim’s internet access 
Setting up two-factor authentication 
for account logins 
Getting into the victim’s accounts, locking 
the victim out of their accounts 
App Data Backing up data Deleting things from the victim’s phone, 
destroying the victim’s phone, taking the 
victim’s phone away 
New Device Getting a new phone Destroying the victim’s phone, taking the 
victim’s phone away 
Table 1. Mitigations 
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Figure 8: Tree of Tactics with Mitigations Overlaid Part 1 
 
 
Figure 9: Tree of Tactics with Mitigations Overlaid Part 2 
 
 
Figure 10: Tree Key and Base Leaves 
 
Figures 8, 9, and 10 show how the mitigations in Table 1 can be applied to the 
tree detailed in Section 4. A box surrounding a section of the tree represents a 
mitigation against the tactics it surrounds. For example, as can be seen on the far left of 
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the tree, blocking the abuser and increasing privacy settings acts as a mitigation to an 
abuser tracking the victim through the posts they make on social media. A higher 
resolution version of the tree can be found at the following link: 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1P1x61DdR6yY3tlBEgxunoh4rxzxI6wlO 
Some gaps are left due to the decision to stick to solely mitigations that involve 
technology, as some abuse tactics can only be mitigated through non-technological 
means. What follows is an outline of the tactics that fall into this category. 
 Most tactics in this category cannot be tackled head-on using technology because, 
to use a grammatical analogy, the victim is involved only as an indirect object. In 
carrying out these attacks, the abuser interacts directly with a third party in order to 
indirectly affect the victim. The victim cannot do anything with their devices to mitigate 
these attacks, as their devices are not involved in the attacks. Examples of this sort of 
attack include the abuser contacting someone close to the victim to keep tabs on or 
harass the victim, harassing people close to the victim, impersonating the victim online 
to damage their reputation, and humiliating or punishing the victim over the internet. 
 Technology also cannot be used to protect the victim’s device from being 
destroyed or stolen by the abuser if the abuser has physical access to it. It can only be 
used to dampen the harmful effects of an attack such as this by making sure the victim 
backs up important data before an attack such as this happens. 
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7. Conclusion 
 People with IDD face much higher rates of abuse than corresponding populations 
without IDD. Thus, making reporting abuse easy for people with IDD (in tandem with 
educating them about abuse) is a goal that feels very pressing. This paper is specifically 
concerned with how abusers can prevent the victims of their abuse from reporting said 
abuse. It is in an abusers’ vested interest to not be reported, and so, if they suspect their 
victim will try and report abuse, they will most likely try to prevent that reporting. An 
abuser has a plethora of possible tactics for preventing reporting at their disposal, many 
of which use technology. These tactics have been divided into four categories in this 
paper: creating a sense of omnipresence, isolating the victim, humiliating or punishing 
the victim, and threatening the victim. Luckily, there are many options that a victim of 
abuse has at their disposal that they may be able to use to counter an abuser’s tactics. 
Many of these involve relatively simple operations such as setting a password, installing 
malware-detection software, or blocking someone on a social media site. Not all tactics 
can be countered, prevented, or dampened using existing technologies, but most can. 
Most prominent of the tactics that cannot be prevented using existing technologies are 
tactics that only indirectly affect the victim. Hopefully, solutions will be devised in the 
near future to account for tactics that cannot be mitigated using existing technologies.  
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8. Future Work 
Fully optimized ease of reporting is a goal that will in all likelihood take several 
generations to achieve, if ever. This paper is intended not only as valuable in its own 
right but also to be groundwork for future research.  
For one, certain tactics could be better defended against with the help of bespoke 
technologies. A piece of software specifically designed to counter a given tactic will most 
likely end up being better at countering that tactic than a preexisting piece of software. 
For example, research into the creation of an Android or iPhone app designed to root 
out phone spyware may result in software that can much more reliably detect spyware 
than malware-detection apps currently available on app stores. 
 Second, research into education-based mitigations would be highly valuable. 
Certain tactics cannot be countered through technological means and so the solution 
becomes educating victims of abuse on how to respond to given tactics in the right way.  
Third, research could be put into the development of a technology, such as a 
phone app or a website, that could serve as an easy medium of abuse reporting as well as 
an educational platform. With the findings of this paper in mind, this technology can be 
designed with an anticipation of an abusers’ anti-reporting tactics in mind. It could also 
make sure to offer pertinent educational material. 
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